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Abstract 
 
The Lebanese economy is subjected to major constraints impeding its growth and its development.  
Public overborrowing constitutes the main obstacle against this growth. The Lebanese economic 
situation is briefly presented in this paper. Then, a measurement of the Lebanese public debt 
dangers is proposed through an econometric model illustrating the snowball effects. After an 
analysis, a simulation aiming at restructuring this debt, with a valuation of the foreign 
indebtedness’ limits, is presented. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he Lebanese financial system, mainly constituted of the banking system, is subjected to major 
constraints impeding its economic growth. The budget and fiscal policies followed in recent decades 
have generated an unbearable public debt. The financing of the budget deficit was ensured, since 
1992, via the accumulation of an increasing public debt, contracted at very high interest rates. Consequently, the 
service of this debt becomes prohibitive in an unfavorable macroeconomic context where paradoxical government 
choices have been applied and were largely illustrated by the fixity of the exchange rate
1
 and by a periodical upward 
pressure on interest rates.  
 
The coexistence of a budget deficit in continuous progression with very high interest rate levels carried the 
public debt servicing to a point of no return (since 1995, the debt service exceeded 80% of the public revenues). In 
the contemporary economic language, this phenomenon is called the snowball effect.  
 
This study proposes a recapitulation of the Lebanese economic situation, followed by an analysis of the 
Lebanese public debt aiming at measuring the dangers and the consequences of the snowball effects.  
 
Beyond the Lebanese specificities, the overborrowing situation of this country has become a consistent 
"academic case" allowing the illustration of the snowball phenomenon and its consequences. Therefore, the main 
issue of this paper aims not only at proposing several leads and approaches related to the Lebanese snowball effect 
but also at making this paper useful and practical for studying other Third World Countries’ public debts.  
 
1.  The Present Economic Situation 
 
1.1.  Administrative Shortcomings 
 
Bad administrative management plays a major role in restricting solutions for socio-economic crises. 
Indeed, Public Administration in Lebanon suffers from mediocrity in terms of productivity, efficiency, leadership, 
let alone disguised unemployment, absence of statistics, incompetent recruitment, etc. These handicaps and similar 
others lead, inevitably, to an administration that is over costly and ends up with big budgetary burden unaffordable 
by the present Lebanese economy. 
 
                                                 
1  The Lebanese Pound expressed in USD: 1 dollar = 1500 Lebanese Pounds. 
T 
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The Administration recruits 20% of the productive forces in the country as compared to 2% recruited by the 
banking sector. While as the 2% in terms of productivity equals the 20% if not more.  
 
The question however is not only administrative, but reflects the political life of the country, greatly based 
on familial and confessional differences, and divisions which impedes the development of a modern State, in which 
the rule of citizenship dominates.  
 
1.2.  Costly Reconstruction  
 
Lebanon, despite the fact that it has considerably progressed in terms of reconstruction and infrastructure, 
presents a real decrease in the production level compared with its potential resources. This has been negatively 
reflected on individual revenues, internal consumption capacity, and output levels of the economy. A sound 
economic policy that aims at ensuring social justice is supposed to promote production, optimize the use of natural 
resources capable to expand productive bases, reduce the balance of payment’s deficit, create employment 
opportunities, and initiate an economic growth congruent with a social development objective.  
 
Development projects in Lebanon, registered under the label of reconstruction, have been noticeably 
distracted from the above-mentioned strategies. In fact, they have been financed by external loans on short-term 
basis and at commercial interest rates. These projects however are still incomplete. They have been vitiated by 
abnormal high costs and bribes, knowing that tenders were often concluded by mutual agreement instead of legal 
competition.    
 
Given that the profitability of these projects is for long term, the reimbursement of loans has been done 
through new loans. This has discredited the official feasibility studies and increased the general debt
2
 that has 
jumped from 2.5 billion dollars in 1992 to 19.47 billions in 1998 and to 22.3 billion dollars in 1999 ending up with 
31.5 billions for 2002.    
 
Therefore, the impact of public expenses on the social and economic life is minor. Public funds have been 
consumed without stimulating the business cycle, or improving social development and national prosperity. De 
facto, the budget deficit is largely responsible for the financial crisis: deficit to total expenses reached 85% in 1990, 
61% in 1997, has passed to 44% in 1999, and exceeded 45% in 2002.  
 
1.3.  An Economy That Serves Its Currency 
 
Viewed from this angle, the current monetary fixity – obtained at this prohibitive cost – is not really a 
panacea. Actually, high interest rate policy, represented by the budget category called “ public debt service”, which 
is currently at 80% of the total budget revenue, have impoverished the country, reduced productive investments, 
transformed the whole national economy into a rent economy and failed to make of the national currency a real 
reserve currency
3
. The Lebanese Pound is not anymore used as a currency for loan
4
, because the majority
5
 of credits 
granted to private sectors are made in foreign currency. Therefore, the present confidence in the Lebanese Pound 
isn’t but temporary, since it is based on return generated6 not on conviction. Only a policy aiming at rebuilding the 
economy is likely to reinforce, on a permanent basis, the Lebanese currency.   
 
The growth of the Lebanese economy - or more precisely, that of the national revenue - is found to have 
slowed down since 1994. It is characterized by a drop in the level of production and revenue and, conversely, in a 
progress in the level of rents and taxes. The result was a big concentration of capital movements, as a consequence 
of profits that capital holders have drawn from the present rent economy. Only one percent of Lebanese account 
                                                 
2  Lebanese Banks Association: Annual reports 1998-1999-2000-2001-2-3. 
3  65% of the total banking deposits in average are denominated in US dollar not in Lebanese Pound.  
4  i.e. private loans allocated to finance private corporations and other productive projects.  
5  84% of loans allocated for the private sector in 2002 were made in USD. 
6  Most of investors (constituted mainly of commercial banks) subscribe their funds in Treasury Bonds issued in Lebanese Pounds because 
Treasury Bonds represent the most attractive assets to invest in and offer the highest possible interest (interest rates served on TB’s averaged 
25% from 1993 to 2001). 
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holders have 40% of the whole banking deposits as compared to 2% of borrowers who benefit of 66% of available 
funds for credit purposes
7
.  
 
Altogether, this fixity policy is neither encouraging the full use of the available resources nor contributing 
to the mobilization of human capital in the improvement of labor skills.  
 
1.4.  Fiscal Inequality 
 
Fiscal inequality is obvious and harmful in Lebanon. Therefore, reforming the Lebanese fiscal system 
should be radical and following economic and social specific criteria. In other terms, the reform
8
 should aim at 
making this system more receptive to economic recovery and more socially equitable.  In fact, the distribution of 
revenue shows a critical increase of social inequalities. Added to all this, third of the country’s population is 
displaced
9
.  
 
1.5.  Low Return On Investment  
 
Return on investment in the private sector is hampered by the high return generated from Lebanese 
Treasury bonds. Since 1995, Lebanon is suffering from a severe crowd-out effect. Consequently, supportive 
infrastructure for a better production
10
 has been completely neglected.  
 
2.  Public Overborrowing And Snowball Effect 
 
The problem of budget deficit and of public indebtedness appeared with the starting of the civil war
11
 in 
Lebanon. In fact, public revenues, before 1975, were equivalent, even higher than public expenditures. Until the end 
of 1992, the public deficit was often counterbalanced by loans granted by the Lebanese Central Bank. This had 
deeply contributed to the rise of the inflation rate and to the deterioration of the exchange rate of the Lebanese 
Pound against the US dollar.  
 
Starting 1993, a currency exchange fixity policy was adopted. This policy consisted of fixing the Lebanese 
Pound against the US dollar
12
 and even progressively to improving this rate. The financing of the budget deficit by 
the Lebanese Central Bank was then stopped to be limited to financial institutions
13
 and to the public.  
 
This plan was accompanied by a strongly expansionist budget policy that went on until 1998 and that 
generated a rise in public expenditures (between 1993 and 1997) to a real average
14
 rate of 22.4% a year, against a 
rate of 9.6% for revenues. As a result, the budget deficit rose to the GDP, moving from 9.3% in 1993 to 26% in 
1997 and 18% in 2001. Parallel to this rise, public indebtedness increased very quickly, moving from 52% of the 
GDP in 1993, to 103% in 1997. In 2000, it rose to 147% of the GDP to reach 182% in 2002. 
 
                                                 
7  Yachoui E., (1998). Working paper presented during a conference on the Lebanese Economy « Les Déboires de l’Economie Nationale ». 
8  This restructuring presupposes firm political and social choices such as: fighting illicit enrichment, increasing public revenues and reducing the 
budget deficit. The increase of revenue levels is dependent, in the case of Lebanon, on two imperatives: the first consists of the personalization 
of taxes based on real revenues of taxpayers, and the second deals with inspecting productivity gains and enhancing collection procedures. 
9  Report of « Fonds National des déplacés » (1998) 
10  Such as the promotion of industrial zones equipments, the increase of cultivated and irrigated surfaces, the support of labor forces (training, 
preparing, educating, etc.), and so forth.  
11  In 1975 
12  Presently 1 dollar = 1500 Lebanese Pounds. 
13  Mainly constituted of commercial banks. 
14  Calculated at constant prices. 
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Table 1- Public Finance Situation (in billion LP) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002** 
Overall revenues 1855 2241 3033 3533 3753 4449 4868 4552 4650 4335 
Global 
expenditure 
3069 5379 6342 7732 9662 8385 8910 10684 9138 7195 
Including debt 
service  
784 1488 1875 2653 3378 3352 3624 4197 4312 3251 
Public deficit  1214 3138 3309 4199 5909 3936 4042 6132 4488 2860 
Global public 
debt at the end of 
period 
6648 10779 14155 20189 23501 29213* 33732 37643 42723 46650 
GDP  13122 15305 18028 20417 22880 24509 24816 24816 25188 26700 
Deficit / GDP (%) 9,25 20,50 18,35 20,57 25,83 16,06 16,29 24.7 18  
Public debt / GDP 
(%) 
50,66 70,43 78,52 98,88 102,71 119,19 136 151.7 170.5 182*** 
Debt service / 
Overall revenues 
(%) 
42,26 66,40 61,82 75,09 90,01 75,34 74,44 92.2 92.7 93*** 
Debt service / 
GDP (%) 
5,97 9,72 10,40 12,99 14,76 13,68 14,60 16.9 17.2  
* Including the sum of LP 1242 billion owed by the State to the contractors, hospitals… 
** During the nine months of the year 2002. 
*** Covering the year 2002 
Sources: Association of Banks in Lebanon, Annual Reports 1998-2002. 
Lebanese Central Bank, Monthly Bulletins, 1998-2003. 
 
 
2.1.  Public Overborrowing 
 
The share of the public debt in the GDP reached 182% in 2002 against 49% in 1992. The overrun of the 
100% ceiling in reference to the criteria of the World Bank, the IMF or the Maastricht Agreement is becoming 
alarming. The question to know whether the Lebanese economy is capable of absorbing this debt volume and 
rendering it solvable has become very acute since the public debt is increasing at a rhythm superior to that of the 
GDP. Besides, the slow down in the growth of the Lebanese economy, is probably leading to the aggravation of the 
crisis causes. 
 
2.2.  The Danger Of Public Debt And The Snowball Effect: Simulation And Modeling 
 
The analysis
15
 of risks involved in the evolution of the public debt requires elucidating the relation between 
the public debt rate to the GDP on the one hand, and the inflation rate, the economic growth rate, and the interest 
rates on public debt on the other hand. This relation can be written as follows: 
 
dt= -[(i-n)/(1+n)]*bt-1 (1) 
 
where: 
 
i is the real interest rate paid on the total public debt 
n is the growth rate of the GDP 
bt-1 is the debt rate to the GDP during the year t-1 
dt is the rate of primary deficit to the GDP during the year t 
 
                                                 
15  Klein T. (1994). « External Debt Management: An Introduction » World Bank Technical Paper No.245. Bruton H., et Hill C., (1997). « The 
Evaluation of Public Expenditure » EDI Learning Ressource Series. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                            Volume 3, Number 8 
 19 
Table 2- Evolution Of The Public Debt (End Of Period) 
 
In billion LBP Dec.95 Dec.96 Dec.97 Dec.98 Dec.99 Dec.00 Dec 01 Sep 02 
1- Total public debt (PD) 14 155 20 188 23 503 28 120 33 718 37 643 42 674 46 650 
Variation % 31.1 42.6 16.4 19.9 19.9 11.6 13.4 9.3 
         
2- Internal debt  11 997 17 229 19 787 21 686 25 383 27 161 28 214 28 047 
Variation % 28.3 43.6 14.8 9.6 17.0 7 3.9 (0.6) 
a- Central Bank of Lebanon  195 124 375 281 115 1726 6251 5750 
Variation % 85.7 (36.4) 202.4 (25.1) (59.1) 1400.9 262.2 (8.0) 
b- Commercial banks 8 453 12 638 13 532 16 133 18 966 18 736 15 830 15 938 
Variation % 15.1 49.5 7.1 19.2 17.6    
c- Other  3 349 4 467 5 880 5 272 6 302 6699 6133 6359 
Variation % 76.4 33.4 31.6 (10.3) 19.5 6.3 (8.4) 3.7 
         
3- Foreign debt  2 158 2 959 3 714 6 434 8 336 10 482 14 460 18 603 
Variation % 48.6 37.1 25.6 69.1 29.6 25.7 38.0 28.7 
         
4- Public sector deposits  2710 3871 1406 2142 4 006 2 631 1 913 1 954 
Variation % 2.8 42.8 (63.7) 52.3 87.0 (34.3) (27.3) 2.1 
 
In percentage Dec.95 Dec.96 Dec.97 Dec.98 Dec.99 Dec.00 Dec 01 Sep 02 
1- Total public debt (PD) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2- Internal Debt 84.8 85.3 84.2 77.5 75.3 72.2 66.1 60.1 
a- Central Bank 1.4 0.6 1.6 1.0 0.3 4.6 14.6 12.3 
b- Commercial Banks 59.7 62.6 57.6 57.7 56.2 49.8 37.1 34.2 
c- Other 23.7 22.1 25.0 18.9 18.7 17.8 14.4 13.6 
3- Foreign Debt 15.2 14.7 15.8 22.5 24.8 27.8 33.9 39.9 
Source: Central Bank of Lebanon, monthly bulletins (1995-2003) 
 
 
This equation lays down two possibilities: 
 
1- If n>i:  The explosion of the debt can be avoided because inflation and growth are enough to stabilize the debt 
rate to the GDP. Therefore, the government continues to achieve a limited primary deficit that can be covered 
through indebtedness. 
 
2- If n<i:  It is the snowball effect, where only interest rates are responsible for the public debt increase. In this case, 
dt is negative, and the government should achieve a primary surplus that can reduce the total amount of the public 
debt. However, the main difficulty lies in the evaluation of the capacity of governments to achieve a primary surplus 
in the short run and to adopt fiscal expenditure policies that would enable the achievement of this surplus in the 
future. However, if these measures sound difficult to implement, the only solution left is to bet on inflation and 
growth as the means to moderate the volume of the debt.  
 
It appears from what has been stated that the Lebanese financial situation has reached a critical stage where 
the growth rate of the nominal GDP is inferior to the average interest paid on the public debt. Besides, the total 
amount of the public debt has exceeded that of the GDP. In order to stabilize the debt, equation (1) should be 
applied.  
 
We will apply
16
 this equation to the results of the year 1997 and 1998 because during these 2 years we had 
full access to the required data for the application of our simulation model, unlike other years. However, conclusions 
                                                 
16  It’s worth reminding that the main purpose of this model is to illustrate the concept and the application fine points of the snowball effect of the 
Lebanese public debt in order to build a standard model that can be applied (using the same methodology) to any Third World Country 
suffering from high public debts.  
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                            Volume 3, Number 8 
 20 
are still the same for the year 2003 since the public debt is still growing (185% of the GDP as of September 2003) 
and all other economic indicators are still the same, not say, deteriorating.  
 
D 98= -(0.1478-0.09/1+0.09) b97= 0.01566x1.0597=-0.0562 
 
Taking into account this equation, and in order to stabilize the share of the public debt, Lebanon had to 
achieve a primary surplus with a proportion of 5.62% of the GDP in 1998. In other words, the government had to 
achieve a surplus of 1.359 billion LP (GDPx5.62%). However, available figures show that the financial year closed 
with a primary deficit of 172 billion Lebanese Pounds. 
 
Of course it is not an easy task to get to control the snowball effect. However, the government can succeed 
if it follows one of the following tracks: 
 
1. Achieve a primary surplus through reducing expenditures (budget austerity, administrative reforms, etc.) 
and / or through increasing revenues (better tax collection, tax system reform). 
2. Bet on increasing the economic growth rate to reduce the difference (then revert it) between nominal 
growth rate and nominal interest rate on the public debt. It is worth mentioning that increasing the nominal 
growth rate can be achieved via two ways: 
 
a real revitalization of the national economic growth that would increase budget revenues 
b go back to high inflation rates. 
 
A concomitant realization of both options can be observed however. 
 
1. Reduce rates paid on the debt through adopting one of the two following measures: 
 
a Radical modification of the monetary policy in force: 
 
1. Reducing systematic interventions in the money market 
2. Increasing money supply.  
 
This strategy can be adopted for the purpose of reducing interest rates on the Lebanese Pound while letting 
the national currency fluctuating within a determined margin according to the market characteristics. In fact, the 
objective is to avoid a costly monetary pricing applied independently of real economic facts. 
 
b Restructuring of the public debt:  
 
Conversion of one part of the internal
17
 public debt into an external debt
18
 in view of a direct reduction of 
the average rate paid on the total debt. Such a reform helps reducing the debt service together with the deficit. It also 
allows deposits in Lebanese Pounds to have better availability for private local investment. Hence, expected 
outcomes would be illustrated via a reduction of interest rates on the Lebanese Pound
19
 and via a reduction of public 
financial expenses
20
. This would eventually promote investment and generate positive growth rates that would 
enable the State to improve its revenues and accordingly reduce its deficit and its need for additional indebtedness. 
 
2.3.  Assessment Of The Government’s Attempt To Restructure The Public Debt In 1998 
 
In its attempt to restructure the public debt, the government got Parliament approval to finance a part of the 
1998 budget deficit with about 2 billion dollars of loans collected on international markets. During 1998, the 
government borrowed USD 1.450 millions on international markets. These loans were distributed as follows: 
                                                 
17  Public debt denominated in Lebanese Pounds. 
18  Public debt denominated in foreign currencies.  
19  Because of the lower public demand. 
20  Due to the decrease of interest rates. 
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Table 3 -International Issuance In 1998 
 
Issuance  Value in million $/ Duration (year) Average revenue % Issuing price 
First issuance 500 3 7.38 101 
Second issuance 500 5 8.22 100.88 
Third issuance 450 7 8.79 99.25 
Total/average 1450 4.93 8.11 100.42 
Source: Lebanese Banks Association, Annual Report 1997-1998-1999-2000. 
 
 
The average interest rate paid on euro-bonds was about 8% in 1998 with a spread of 3.58 points to 
American Treasury bonds of the same category. Annual repayments have reached USD 116 millions (8% x USD 
1450 millions), whereas repayments for the same amount of loan denominated in national currency would have been 
USD 232.6 millions (16.05% x USD 1.450 millions). Thanks to this interest differential, the Treasury has been able 
to save USD 116.6 millions. In addition to savings on interest spread, these loans enabled the Government to 
increase the maturity date of settlement. However, the Government has got to ensure an annual reserve in foreign 
currencies of about USD 294 millions to be able to settle the loan’s principal at the end of the last maturity date.  
 
2.3.1.  Restructuring The Public Debt: Repercussions Of External Debt 
 
2.3.1.1.  Action On The Snowball Effect 
 
Three scenarios are proposed here so as to estimate their impact on debt restructuring at the end of the year 
1997: 
 
1. First scenario: primary deficit in 1998 equal to the primary deficit in 1997. 
2. Second scenario: primary balance in 1998.  
3. Third scenario: primary surplus in 1998. 
 
These scenarios are based on the hypothesis of stabilizing the structure of debts in foreign currencies, 
which allows the application of the average interest rate (as calculated above) to this debt (i.e. 8%). 
 
First scenario: 
 
This scenario implies that primary deficit should maintain in 1998 its 1997’s level, i.e. 2.025 billion 
Lebanese Pounds. This level would shift the deficit rate to GDP, d, to 9.38%. Therefore, and based on these 
hypotheses, we conclude that the theoretical level of the average interest (as calculated in equation 2) susceptible to 
stabilize the public debt in 1998, while taking into account the estimated level of deficit, is 0.38%, which is 
impossible. 
 
0.0838= (i-0.09/1.09)*1.0597  i= 0.0038  (2) 
 
Second scenario: 
 
With respect to the second scenario, the equation becomes:  
 
0= -(i-0.09/1.09)*1.0597 i= 0.09  (3) 
 
Thus, the theoretical level of the average interest is supposed to be 9% in 1998, so as to make the total debt 
service equal to 2 115 billion Lebanese Pounds, (or 9% *dt-1) which is the total of the debt at the end of 1997. The 
debt structure supposed to be subject to this interest becomes: 
 
0.1605x+0.08y = 2.115 billion Lebanese Pounds   (4) 
 
and x + y = 23.501  (5) 
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where 
 
“x” represents the public debt in national currency and 
“y” the public debt in foreign currencies (end of 1997). 
 
Therefore, according to (4) and (5) 
 
x = LP 2.919 billions and  
y = LP 20.585 billions. 
 
In order to stabilize the public debt rate to the GDP with respect to the second scenario, the government 
should decrease the average interest rate paid on the total public debt to bring it back to 9%. This objective can be 
reached via an increase in the total external debt to around 20.585 billion Lebanese Pounds, which will lead the 
external debt’s weight to 87% of the total public debt. 
 
Third scenario: 
 
This scenario implies the realization of a primary surplus of 281 billion Lebanese Pounds, as expected in 
the 1998 projected budget, which makes the deficit rate related to the GDP equal to d = -1.162%.  In this case 
equation (1) becomes: 
 
-0.01162 = (i-0.09/1.09)*1.0597 → i= 0.1019  (6) 
 
With respect to an interest rate of 10.19%, a total debt amount of 2.395 billion Lebanese Pounds 
(10.19%*23.501) should be considered. Hence, the structure of this debt will be as follows: 
 
0.1605x+0.08y = LP 2.395 billions  (7) 
 
x + y = LP 23.504 billions  (8) 
 
According to (7) and (8)   
 
x = LP 6.393 billions and  
y = LP 17.111 billions. 
 
In this perspective, the government needs to reduce the average interest rate to 10.19% by increasing the 
total external indebtedness to 17.111 billion Lebanese Pounds, which means converting additional 13.394 billion 
Lebanese Pounds into foreign currencies debt
21
.  
 
2.3.2.  Limits Of Foreign Indebtedness 
 
The massive recourse to foreign indebtedness, although it aims at absorbing the financial shock, poses a 
problem especially when it comes to the part of loans assumed by non-residents. 
 
The World Bank applies a specific model
22
, which is based on a balanced relation between the growth rate 
of the external debt, exportation, and balance of payments, as shown by the following equation: 
 
dZ= i-B/D-x  (9) 
 
                                                 
21  Which will increase the external debt weight to 73% of the total debt. 
22  Klein T. (1994). « External Debt Management: An Introduction » World Bank Technical Paper No.245. Bruton H., et Hill C., (1997). « The 
Evaluation of Public Expenditure » EDI Learning Ressource Series. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                            Volume 3, Number 8 
 23 
where: 
 
“Z” reflects the foreign debt rate or the share of the foreign public debt service in exports, i.e. D/X, 
“X” represents exports, 
“D” represents the value of the foreign debt service for the period in question. This debt service covers interest and 
principal repayments. 
“dZ” corresponds to the variation of the foreign indebtedness rate Z, 
“i” is the average interest paid on foreign debt, 
“x” represents the annual rate of exports growth, 
“B” reflects the balance of payments amount at the end of period. 
“dZ” defines the sign (or the orientation) of foreign indebtedness rate. 
 
1. When dZ is negative, the rate of foreign indebtedness tends to decrease, 
2. When dZ is positive, on the contrary, the rate increases. 
 
Foreign indebtedness rate diminishes when:  
 
i <x+B/D. 
 
Therefore,  
 
1. If a surplus occurs in the balance of payments - in other words, if B>0 or B/D>o - this ratio can decrease 
even if the growth rate of exports (value of x) is inferior to the interest rate i, since x> (i-B)/D can be 
realized. 
2. In case of a deficit in the balance of payments - i.e. B<0 - the ratio can only decrease when x exceeds i by a 
value equal to B/D. 
 
The application of the previous inequation allows to fix the degree of tolerance of the foreign debt. We have 
applied this model to available financial data for the years 1997 and 1998.  
 
1.  Results of the year 1997 
 
The following table shows data and hypotheses related to the distribution of the foreign debt over the 
financial year 1997: 
 
Table 4-Foreign Debt Distribution In 1997 
 
 Value of credits 
(in million 
dollars) 
Average duration 
of credits (in 
years) 
Annual average of 
principal repayment 
(in million dollars) 
Interest on 
foreign debt 
Annual average 
interest (in 
million dollars) 
Average debt 
services on foreign 
debt** (in million 
dollars) 
Eurobonds  1 050 5 210 8% 84 294 
Other credits 
* 
1 325 10  8%  197 
Total foreign 
debt 
2 375   8%  491 
*The average of annual repayments (interest and principal) is calculated on the basis of equal annual total amounts over 10 years. 
**The average service of foreign debt is theoretically due and unpaid thus, it must be considered as a provision. 
 
 
The previous table allows the estimation of the foreign debt service, interest and principal included, as 
being approximately equal to USD 491 millions in 1997. Moreover, at the end of this year, the surplus in the balance 
of payments reached USD 420 millions and exports decreased by 12.26%. 
Therefore, equation (9) becomes: 
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dZ= 0.08-420/491-(-) 0.1226=-0.652  (10) 
 
The surplus in the balance of payments allowed to preserve the negativity of dZ and conferred to the 
government a new potential of indebtedness in foreign currencies. 
 
2.  Results of the year 1998 
 
The following table shows data and hypotheses related to the distribution of the foreign debt over the 
financial year 1998: 
 
Table 5-Foreign Debt Distribution In 1998 
 
 Value of 
credits (in 
million 
dollars) 
Average duration 
of credits (in 
years) 
Annual average of 
principal repayment 
(in million dollars) 
Interest on 
the foreign 
debt 
Annual 
average 
interest (in 
million dollars) 
Average debt 
service on foreign 
debt (in million 
dollars) ** 
Euro-bonds  2 500 5 500 8% 200 700 
Other credits* 1 677 10  8%  250 
Total foreign 
debt 
4 177   8%  950 
*The average of annual repayments (interest and principal) is calculated on the basis of equal annual total amounts over 10 years. 
**The average service of foreign debt is theoretically due and unpaid thus, it must be considered as a provision. 
 
 
The service of the foreign debt in 1998 is estimated at USD 950 millions. In addition, the deficit in the 
balance of payments reached USD 487.6 millions at the end of 1998 and exports increased by 11.18%.  Therefore, 
equation (9) becomes: 
 
dZ = 0.08+487.6/950-0.1118=0.482  (11) 
 
First conclusion: dZ is positive at the end of 1998. This occurred despite the improvement in the level of 
exports. Therefore, the potential of foreign indebtedness
23
 has become very limited. It becomes related to the 
capacity of the economy to achieve a surplus in the balance of payment in order to enable the government repaying 
the loan. 
 
Considering the case where dZ is inferior or equal to zero, the growth of exports (x) will be equal to: 
 
x>0.08+487.6/950>0.59 i.e. x>i-B/D  (12) 
 
According to equation (12), the growth rate of exports
24
 is supposed to exceed 59%.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In the light of the above results, and in order to stop the snowball effect, the stabilization of the public debt 
requires a restructuring of the public debt where the volume of foreign debt to total debt should fluctuate between 73 
and 87%. This objective seems hardly applicable in the current situation given the status of the balance of payments 
and exports
25
 growth rate.  
                                                 
23  i.e. indebtedness in foreign currencies 
24  It’s worth mentioning that Lebanon has systematic recourse to imports in order to cover public and private consumption needs. 
25     
In Million $ 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Balance of trade -5529 -5512 -640 -3985 
Exports 678 713 889 768 
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Besides, the major lesson to be drawn from the positive value of dZ is that the continuation of indebtedness 
in foreign currency
26
 is not anymore an option towards the stabilization of the debt’s share in the GDP. Hence, a 
massive indebtedness in foreign currencies will expose the national banking sector to multiple risks
27
.  
 
The Lebanese economy shows acute cases of asphyxia and structural imbalances illustrated by: (1) A 
severe indebtedness crisis resulting from continuous borrowing in order to finance non-productive activities. (2) An 
intolerable public deficit absorbing a fundamental part of local financial resources. (3) A permanent deficit in the 
balance of trade that is seriously threatening the balance of payments. This crisis is getting worse and deeper. 
Therefore, adjusting the situation requires the adoption of a set of reforms dealing with the implementation of a 
realistic exchange rate, a new structure of interest rates, a fundamental change of the tax system, and a 
reorganization of the administration far from political interferences. 
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